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Abstract
Real exchange rate policy can potentially be utilized to target the
trade balance and/or development through capital accumulation. How-
ever, the presence of distributional conict and the trade-o¤ between cur-
rent and future trade imbalances complicates matters. I show that policy
assignment matters for dynamic stability. Moreover, the relative saving
behavior of di¤erent functional income groups inuences dynamic behav-
ior. The analysis sheds light on why real exchange rate policy may often
be unfeasible, even if desirable from a developmental perspective.
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1 Introduction and Background
Real exchange rate policy has traditionally been understood as most directly
relevant to the balance of payments of a country. A relatively recent body of lit-
erature suggests, in addition, that the level and trajectory of the real exchange
rate matters for long-run growth, investment, and development. History and
empirical analysis have shown, however, that real exchange rate policy also mat-
ters for social stability and political longevity.1 The relative stakes ensure that,
in any clash between these sets of considerations, the latter is likely to win
hands down more often than not. This paper analyzes the underlying tensions
that lead to dynamic instability. Building on previous literature, I model the
tension between distributional conict, external account constraints, and devel-
opment to make the case that saving behavior and assignment of instruments
to objectives matters. This underlines the need to take policy design seriously.
Lets turn rst to the role of exchange rate adjustment in managing a coun-
trys external accounts. The traditional version of the Mundell-Fleming model
leads to the principle of e¤ective market classication," which requires that the
use of an instrument be directed towards the target that it can most inuence.
In general this implies that monetary policy should target the balance of pay-
ments while scal spending targets the internal balance (i.e., full employment)
in x-price frameworks. With global nancial liberalization in the eighties and
nineties, interest in the external balance  as dened by the current account
waned until the advent of the Asian crisis of 1997-98, and even more gen-
erally, the global nancial crisis in 2008-09 re-awakened policy concerns. An
interesting exception was the Balance of Payments-Constrained (BPCG) fam-
ily of models in the Post-Keynesian tradition. While this framework puts the
spotlight on the external balance as the ultimate long-run constraint on growth,
it de-emphasizes the role of real exchange rate adjustments. Current accounts
continue to matter and, evidence suggests, so do real exchange rate adjustments.
Consider next the relationship between real exchange rate and growth. Here
the time horizon under consideration becomes important. As pointed out
by Diaz-Alejandro (1963), Krugman and Taylor (1978), Lizondo and Montiel
(1989), Razmi (2007), and others, nominal devaluations can be contractionary
in the short run. One reason stands out from the perspective of this paper;
nominal devaluations, which in the short run turn into real devaluations, tend
to shift income away from low saving groups and toward high saving ones,
negatively impacting demand for domestic goods in the short-run. A higher
economy-wide saving rate, on the other hand, can be a blessing for long-run
growth, especially for economies in their early stages of industrialization. It
may have facilitated Englands take-o¤ in the rst half of the eighteenth century
1As noted by (Cooper (1971), p. 3) in their classic study of large exchange rate changes
in developing countries, devaluations are one of the most dramatic even traumatic mea-
sures of economic policy that a government may undertake. Steinberg and Malhotra (2014)
calculate that, between 1973-2006, military dictators lost power during 17 percent of their
forty-eight devaluation episodes and democratic leaders did so in 38 percent of their seventy-
nine devaluations.
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and may also have been important in other cases of industrial catch-up.2
Recent literature that has focused on long-run associations has found a pos-
itive relationship between real exchange rate undervaluation on the one hand,
and output growth and capital accumulation on the other. Examples include
Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2007), Gala (2008), Rodrik (2008), Razmi et al.
(2012), and Libman et al. (2019). The evidence tends to be particularly ro-
bust for developing countries, although the jury is still out as to the relative
importance of the specic mechanisms in play. East Asia is a much-discussed
exemplar in this regard. This makes one wonder why, if real undervaluation
generates long-run benets, do developing countries in general tend to pursue
policies that generate either (i) overvaluation over extended periods of time, or
(2) volatility with exchange rate cycles?
The electoral business cycle literature may help provide some answers.3 In
the absence of real wage rigidity, nominal and real undervaluations lower the real
wage and boost tradable sector protability. The tradable sector, especially the
parts that are not agriculture or primary commodity related tend to be relatively
small in the initial stages of economic development. Thus, a major reason why
policy makers cannot sustain real undervaluations has to do with distributional
concerns. As Damill and Frenkel (2017) point out in the context of recent
Latin American experience, the tendency towards appreciation is appealing. It
facilitates increase in tradable goodsconsumption while allowing real wages to
grow without generating ination. This consideration gains further salience if
the proportion of tradables in the consumption basket increases as one moves
down the income distribution.4
I explore the dynamic interaction between distributional conict and the role
of the real exchange rate in the presence of developmental goals and an exter-
nal balance constraint. In addition to the real exchange rate, policy makers
have another instrument, i.e., the mix of government spending on consumption
and investment subsidies. I introduce distributional considerations through two
channels: (1) distributional conict that emerges in a bargaining environment,
(2) di¤erential saving behavior out of prots and wages. The analysis demon-
strates that the assignment of instruments matters for stability. In particular, it
highlights the tension between easing the external constraint today versus taking
steps that address it over time while promoting investment. Unpopular mea-
sures that generate trade surpluses may consequently lead to destabilizing scal
measures. Finally, it shows that low di¤erentials between saving rates among
2See Allen (2009) for a detailed exploration of the English case and Broadberry et al. (2015)
for a study of Japanese catch-up.
3See, for example, Stein and Streb (2004) who consider the timing of devaluations relative
to the election cycle. Frieden et al. (2001) belongs to the literature that concludes that
governments tend to maintain appreciated exchange rates up until after the elections in order
to keep purchasing power high. Dornbusch (1996) considers the political factors that prevent
authorities from correcting overvaluations, often in the face of impending crisis. Frieden and
Broz (2006) surveys the literature on the political economy of exchange rate regimes.
4For example, Cravino and Levchenko (2015) found that, following the 1994 Mexican
devaluation, the cost of living for the bottom income decile rose 1.48 to 1.62 times more than
for the top income decile, mainly because lower deciles consume a larger share of tradables.
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di¤erent functional income groups act to stabilize the system. A decade ago,
Rodrik (2009)[p. 23] argued that, in the presence of trade balance constraints,
industrial policy can be assigned to the structural transformation target while
the exchange rate is assigned to the external balance. The present paper can
partly be interpreted as a formal development of this argument. I nd that
using real exchange rate policy to target the trade balance directly while us-
ing subsidies to target investment helps generate stability, especially when the
saving rates do not signicantly di¤er between functional income groups.
Razmi et al. (2012) is perhaps the paper that is closest in spirit to the
present one. That paper develops a framework in which policy makers have two
targets, an accumulation target and a trade balance one, and two instruments,
the real exchange rate and investment subsidies. The framework is static so
the stability properties and transitional dynamics of the system with alternative
instrument assignments cannot be analyzed. Moreover, distributional conict
is not formally investigated.
The discussion here and later assumes that authorities typically inuence the
path of the real exchange rate over time. This may or may not be a plausible
assumption, depending on various factors such as the degree of capital account
openness and the monetary/exchange rate regime. As the analysis in later
sections indicates, the degree to which policy can inuence the real exchange
rate in a developing economy may itself be a function of the constraints involved.
The next section develops the basic framework. Section 3 analyzes the
trade-o¤s and stability issues that come with each set of policy assignments.
Finally, Section 4 concludes.
2 Basic Framework
I will develop the simple framework in this section to later argue that policy
assignment and saving rates matter for the sustainability of development policy.
The basic framework here consists of an economy with two sectors; the tra-
ditionalN -sector produces non-tradable goods such as informal services and
lower quality agricultural goods while the modern/advanced T -sector produces
industrial and high quality agricultural goods that are internationally tradable.
In addition there is a government that spends out of tax revenues. The spend-
ing is apportioned between consumption spending and subsidies for investment.
This enables us to directly analyze the e¤ects of policy directed at promoting
capital accumulation.
The non-tradable good requires labor (LN ) and land for its production while
the tradable sector utilizes both labor (LT ) and (accumulable) capital (K) to
produce using a xed coe¢ cients technology. Labor and land are internation-
ally non-tradable while capital goods can be traded across borders. To avoid
unnecessary notation, the unit factor coe¢ cients in the modern sector are nor-
malized to unity. Under these assumptions, eqs. (1)-(5) capture the output side
of the economy (unless stated otherwise, all the relevant variables are expressed
3
in terms of the price of the non-tradable good, PN ):5
YN = L

N ;  < 1 (1)
wN = L
 1
N (2)
RN = (1  )LN (3)
YT = min(KT ; LT ) (4)
LT = KT (5)
where Yi and wi (i = N;T ) denote sectoral outputs while RN represents land
rents. As discussed shortly, the modern/industrial sector employs workers who
are relatively skilled and scarce, and therefore have su¢ cient bargaining power
to maintain a constant real product wage in the steady state. Nominal wage
stickiness in the short run can also be justied by the e¢ ciency wage argument
in the context of scarcity of the skills that are required in the modern sector.
Aggregate private consumption C is the sum of consumption out of landlord,
prot, and wage income after adjustment for taxes. The rate of saving out of
wages sW will generally be higher than that out of prot and rental income sR.
C = [(sR   sW ) + (1  sR)] LN + [(sR   sW )wT + (1  sR)q]KT   T (6)
To keep things simple, and to facilitate analysis of policy assignment, I
assume that the total amount of taxes collected T is constant.6 Moreover,
I assume that the scal decit/surplus is zero. The evolution of stocks of
foreign or domestic assets over time is not the focus here.
Notice that, if sR = sW = s,
C = (1  s)(LN + qKT )  T
Specifying Cobb-Douglas preferences makes the expenditure shares of con-
sumption of the two goods constant in real terms. Lets denote the share
and volume of tradable consumption by  and CT , so that, dening the real
exchange rate q as the relative price of tradables, i.e., q  PT =PN ,
CT =

q
C (7)
CN = (1  )C (8)
5Table 1 provides a dictionary of the main variables for reference.
6As discussed shortly, over time, it is the ratio of tax revenues to the capital stock that is
constant. This assumption can be easily relaxed by specifying a constant tax rate, but that
adds signicant clutter without changing the substance of the argument.
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The price of tradables is internationally given by the small country assump-
tion, so that PT = EP T , where E is the nominal exchange rate (the price of
foreign currency in domestic currency terms).
The government either consumes non-tradable goods or subsidizes invest-
ment in the tradable sector. The latter is designed to boost accumulation
in the modern/capital-using tradable sector. The relevant shares of the tax
revenues falling on consumption GN and subsidies S are  and 1   , respec-
tively. Policy makers shift the spending mix in light of changing economic
conditions. In the later dynamic analysis,  will, therefore, play the role of a
policy instrument that adjusts with a lag.
GN = T (9)
S = (1  )T (10)
Investment depends on tradable sector protability, which in turn is a func-
tion of the real output wage. It also depends on the amount of investment
subsidies provided by the government.
_KT
KT
=
S
KT
+ f

PTYT  WTLT
PTKT

=
S
KT
+ f

1  wT
q

(11)
where I substituted from eqs. (4) and (5) in going from the rst line to the
second. Unlike non-tradables, domestic spending on tradables does not have
to equal domestic output of tradables, and any excess supply translates into a
trade surplus.
TB = YT   CT   _KT
Substituting from eqs. (4), (5), (6), (7), (10), and (11) yields,
TB = KT   
q
f[(sR   sW ) + (1  sR)] LN + [(sR   sW )wT + (1  sR)q]KT   Tg
 (1  )T   f

1  wT
q

KT (12)
Finally, the non-traded good market clearing condition completes the short-
run framework. Recall that the non-tradable good is used for private and
government consumption.
YN = CN +GN
Plugging in the relevant expressions from eqs. (1), (6), (8), and (9),
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LN =
(1  ) [(sR   sW )wT + (1  sR)q]KT + [  (1  )]T
1  (1  )[(sR   sW ) + (1  sR)] (13)
Equation (13) captures the demand-driven nature of output in the N -sector.
The reciprocal of the term in the denominator represents the traditional mul-
tiplier e¤ect. Any expansion of the tradable sector raises demand for non-
tradables, and hence YN . Moreover, any increase in government spending
raises demand and output as long as  > 1 , i.e., as long as the proportion of
government spending on non-tradables is larger than that of private consump-
tion. The intuition for this latter result is simple. A rise in tax revenues
increases government spending at the expense of private consumption. If the
government spends a larger proportion of its income on non-tradables compared
with private consumers, total demand will rise. Given that public spending is
typically tilted heavily toward services, this condition is likely to be satised.
We can now summarize our short-run system with the help of two equations.
The right side of equation (14) expresses the magnitude of excess supply in the
non-tradable sector while that of equation (15) captures trade decits. In order
to facilitate later dynamic analysis, I have normalized all quantity variables by
the capital stock. Thus t  T=KT and tb  TB=KT . Also, to avoid clutter, I
use the symbol  for the saving rate di¤erential (i.e., sR  sW ) and  for 1  sR.
NN(LN ; tb;) =
LN
KT
  (1  )(wT + q) + [  (1  )]t
1  (1  )( + ) (14)
TT (LN ; tb;) = tb  1 + 
q

( + )
LN
KT
+ (wT + q)  t

+

(1  )t+ f

1  wT
q

(15)
The two endogenous variables, tb and LN , adjust to ensure simultaneous
equilibrium, while  represents a vector of exogenous variables, state variables,
and parameters.
The next section species and explores policy assignment, stability, and
trade-o¤s. Before we end this section, however, it would be useful to look
at some of the relevant properties of the system. Specically, lets analyze some
of the comparative statics that become useful later.
To the extent that the saving rate out of wages is lower (i.e.,  > 0), an
increase in the nominal wage in the tradable sector (WT ) raises demand for
non-tradables, generating employment in that sector. In the absence of such
a saving rate di¤erential, N -sector output and employment are unchanged, for
intuitively obvious reasons. The e¤ects on the trade balance are less unam-
biguous. Consider rst the case where there is no saving rate di¤erential. In
this case, the decline in protability and investment caused by the higher wage
generates a trade surplus. In the case where  > 0, this is o¤set by a rise
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in consumption spending. If the saving rate di¤erential is adequately high, a
trade decit results.
These comparative static changes, expressed in mathematical terms, are as
follows:
dLN
dWT
=
(1  )
[1  (1  )( + )]PNL 1N
KT > 0 (16)
dtb
dWT
=

f 0  

(1  )( + )
1  (1  )( + ) + PN



1
PNq
? 0 (17)
Notice that, if sR = sW , the right hand side of the latter simplies to
f 0=PNq. Only the investment e¤ect is operative now and the trade balance
unambiguously improves.
Turning to the real exchange rate, by switching domestic demand towards
non-tradables, a rise in q generates higher non-tradable employment and out-
put. The e¤ects on the trade balance are again multidirectional. On the one
hand, consumption of tradables declines, due both to expenditure-switching and
income e¤ects, as well as to the re-distribution of income towards savers. On
the other hand, consumption of non-tradables, the real value of government
spending, and investment increase, which all work to generate a trade decit.
Assuming that the Marshall-Lerner-Bickerdike-Robinson condition is satised,
the former e¤ect should dominate and the net result is a trade surplus. Math-
ematically,
dLN
dq
=
(1  )
[1  (1  )( + )] L 1N
KT > 0 (18)
dtb
dq
=

q2

( + )LN
KT
+ wT   t  f 0wT

  (1  )( + )q
1  (1  )( + )

? 0
(19)
Finally, whats the e¤ect of a change in the composition of government spend-
ing? This question is central to the later analysis. Suppose the government,
in order to encourage investment, increases subsidies (i.e., lowers ). The re-
sulting cut in public consumption spending reduces non-tradable output and
employment. Less obviously, the e¤ects on the trade balance are to create a
trade decit (q has been normalized to unity in equation (21) without loss of
generality). Intuitively, a shift in the scal mix towards more investment subsi-
dies raises investment, and in spite of lower government consumption spending,
generates a trade decit.7
dLN
d
=
t
[1  (1  )( + )] L 1N
KT > 0 (20)
7This result is contrary to the typical outcome in the literature where a decline in govern-
ment consumption generates a trade surplus The reason for the di¤erence is simple. The
thought experiment here involves a shift in the mix rather than an absolute decline in govern-
ment spending. Since government consumption only indirectly a¤ects the trade balance while
investment subsidies do so directly, the outcome follows.
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dtb
d
=
1  ( + )
1  (1  )( + ) t > 0 (21)
To summarize our analysis, we can use the implicit function theorem to
express our short-run (local) equilibrium solutions for the endogenous variables
as follows:
LN = LN (WT ; q; ); LNW > 0; LNq; LN > 0 (22)
tb = tb(WT ; q; ); tbW ; tbq; tb > 0 (23)
The next section builds on the solutions derived here to explore the policy
trade-o¤s and the dynamics involved over time.
3 Visiting the Trade-o¤s
Our short-run framework allows us to carry out several interesting thought
experiments. In particular, lets consider the trade-o¤s faced by development-
focused policy-makers who face two constraints: (1) they must maintain the
trade balance at a target level over time to avoid prolonged external account
imbalances, and (2) although nominal wages are sticky in the short-run, workers
in the modern tradable sector have enough bargaining power to keep distribution
stable over time. Keeping the (after-tax) income share of T -sector workers
below a certain threshold may accelerate investment but at the cost of generating
political instability and conict, setting in motion processes to reverse course.
Policy makers have trade balance and development (capital accumulation)
targets, tb and I, respectively (both expressed as proportions of the capital
stock). Policy attempts to meet the targets using two instruments, the real
exchange rate q and the mix of scal policy, captured by . Achievement, if
it occurs, is not instantaneous. More realistically, one would expect lags both
in design and execution. I, therefore, utilize partial adjustment mechanisms in
the following sub-sections.
3.1 A simple beginning without distributional inertia
In order to isolate the relevant mechanisms, lets start with a simpler set-up
that ignores distributional considerations by assuming a constant real wage (in
terms of non-tradables). We consider two possible assignments of instruments,
call them Scenarios A and B.
3.1.1 Scenario A: Real exchange rate (RER) policy targets accumu-
lation
Consider rst Scenario A, where policy makers assign the real exchange rate to
the development target and scal spending to the trade balance target. Speci-
cally, policy makers react to below par investment by allowing the real exchange
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rate to rise (depreciate) over time. In the face of a trade decit, scal policy
responds by shifting the mix to subsidizing investment for future tradable pro-
duction in order to reduce the decit over time.
_q = h1(I   _KT )
=  (q; ; I; tb);  q < 0,   > 0 (24)
_ = h2(tb  tb)
= (q; ; I; tb); q > 0,  > 0 (25)
where h1 and h2 are positive constants that capture the speed of adjustment
of the relevant variable in response to any shock. In subsequent analysis, I
normalize these to unity without loss of generality. The Appendix provides the
mathematical expressions for the partial derivatives associated with eqs. (24)
and (25). It may be worthwhile to briey visit the intuition underlying the
signs before we explore stability issues.
Starting with equation (24), the signs of the partials with respect to q and
 are straightforward and follow directly from equation (11). Intuitively, a
positive change in the real exchange rate has a positive impact on protability
and investment, while an increase in investment subsidies raises the level of
investment. Turning to equation (25), the signs follow from the discussion in
the previous section, as summarized by equation (23). Consider a change in
q. Starting with balanced trade, a real overvaluation generates trade decits,
leading policy makers to react by cutting scal consumption and enhancing
subsidies for investment in the tradable sector. This means that policy makers
face an intertemporal trade-o¤. The immediate impact of raising investment
subsidies is to generate a trade decit due to increased investment. Recall,
however, that higher subsidies lead to greater investment and tradable output
over time. This tension between immediate and longer-run e¤ects, as we see
shortly, contributes to dynamic instability.
A quick look at the signs of the partials reveals that the determinant of
the endogenous variable Jacobian is negative. The system exhibits saddle point
instability. Why? To understand the intuition, suppose policy makers decide
to raise the investment target, and proceed, as a result to depreciate the real
exchange rate. This creates a trade surplus, which then invites scal loosening
(increased government consumption). The accompanying cut in investment
subsidies undermines the actual investment rate, pushing it further away from
the initial gap that opened up as a result of the policy change. The tension
between targeting investment (which requires raising investment subsidies now)
and maintaining the external balance (which requires raising government con-
sumption now at the expense of investment subsidies) creates dynamic insta-
bility. If raising subsidies immediately boosted tradable output and reduced
trade decits, i.e., if  were negative, the assignment of instruments will be
much less likely to deliver instability.
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3.1.2 Scenario B: RER policy targets external account stability
Consider next a di¤erent policy assignment, call it Scenario B, where policy
makers assign the real exchange rate to the external account target and s-
cal spending to the development/accumulation target. Specically, they react
to below par investment by redirecting scal spending to investment subsidies
over time. In the face of a trade decit, policy responds by allowing for real
depreciation.
Again, the new system of eqs. (26) and (27) constitute a 2  2 system of
non-linear di¤erential equations.8
_q = h1(tb  tb)
=  (q; ; I; tb;);  q < 0,   < 0 (26)
_ = h2

_KT   I

= (q; ; I; tb;); q > 0,  < 0 (27)
The system is now dynamically stable. The steady state could either be
characterized by monotonic or cyclical adjustment. The intuition is simple.
To see this, lets analyze again the consequences of an exogenous shock such as
a rise in the investment target. Now that policy makers are manipulating the
mix between consumption spending and investment subsidies, they respond by
increasing the share of the latter. Unlike Scenario A, the e¤ect of this initial
response on the trade balance is negative. The trade decit means that real
depreciation follows over time. The movement in this second instrument acts to
further shrink the initial gap between actual and target investment, reecting a
stable system.
To summarize, the assignment of instruments matters. Inappropriate as-
signment creates intertemporal tensions between di¤erent policy objectives and
makes the simultaneous achievement of targets over time unlikely. The next
section builds on this intuition.
3.2 The Role of Distributional Conict
The previous sub-section shows that policy assignment matters. This section
introduces distributional conict through lagged wage adjustment and shows
that, while the overall results from the previous sub-section continue to hold,
wage adjustment and di¤erential saving behavior introduce new complications.
8 I have chosen notation (i.e., the repeated use of  and ), so as to enhance comparability
between the two scenarios. This especially comes in handy in the next section.
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3.2.1 Scenario A: RER policy targets accumulation
For reasons discussed earlier, suppose any change in distribution invites a re-
sponse in the form of nominal wage movements that gradually restore the initial
distribution represented by a real wage that equals  over time.
The extended Scenario A can now be captured by the dynamic set-up en-
capsulated by eqs. (28) - (30), which constitute a 3  3 system of non-linear
di¤erential equations.
_q = k1(I   _KT )
=  (q;WT ; ; I; tb;);  q < 0,  W ,   > 0 (28)
_WT = k2

  wT
q

= (q;WT ; ; I; tb;); q > 0, W < 0,  = 0 (29)
_ = k3(tb  tb)
= (q;WT ; ; I; tb;); q > 0, W ? 0,  > 0 (30)
where k1, k2, and k3 are positive constants that capture the speed of adjustment
of the relevant variable in response to any shock. As in the previous sub-
sections, I normalize these to unity without loss of generality.
The new elements are equation (29) and the partials associated with each
equation with respect to the nominal wage. The signs of these can be explained
as follows. Starting with equations (28) and (29), the signs of the partials with
respect to WT , follow directly from eqs. (11) and (23). Intuitively, changes
in the nominal wage and the real exchange rate have opposite e¤ects on prof-
itability and investment. How does a rise in the nominal wage a¤ect the trade
balance? Here the answer is a bit more involved and depends on the relative
saving rates. In the absence of a di¤erence between saving rates across income
sources (i.e., sR = sW ), the drop in protability and investment leads to a trade
surplus (so that W > 0). If, however, saving out of wages is su¢ ciently small,
so that a rise in the nominal wage strongly boosts consumption, then the out-
come is a trade decit. Finally, the partials associated with equation (29) follow
from the equation itself.
Suppose now that there is an exogenous shock (say the investment target is
set higher). Then (28) tells us that policy makers should begin depreciating
the real exchange rate. This has two e¤ects (see eqs. (29) and (30)): (1) it
raises the trade balance to a level above the target and induces policy makers
to orient scal policy away from investment subsidies, and (2) nominal wages
begin to rise in response to the initial redistribution. Both (1) and (2) have the
e¤ect of reducing investment, further widening the initial gap between target
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and actual investment. As in Section 3.1.1, the assignment of instruments here
is likely to generate instability regardless of the relative saving rates.
More formally, the relevant necessary and su¢ cient Routh-Hurwitz condi-
tions for dynamic stability are:
 q + W +  < 0 (31)
( qW    Wq) + (qW   Wq)  < 0 (32)
 ( q + W + )(W + ) q +  qW
+( q + W ) Wq + ( q + ) q   (W + )W > 0 (33)
Satisfaction of condition (31) requires that  be small i.e.,  <
 q + W .
This, in turn, requires that tradables be a small fraction of private consump-
tion. Suppose for the sake of argument that  is su¢ ciently small so that this
condition is satised. Since  qW =  Wq (see Appendix), condition (32) is
reduced to (qW   Wq)  > 0. In the absence of saving rate di¤erentials
(i.e., when sR = sW ), this condition is unambiguously violated. If sR > sW ,
then the condition could be satised but that requires a relatively small value of
W which undermines satisfaction of condition (31). Put di¤erently, the satis-
faction of the two conditions places contradictory constraints on the sensitivity
of wages to distributional changes (i.e., on the magnitude of W ).
Finally, condition (33) is also unlikely to be satised. Since  qW =  Wq,
it reduces to:
[ (qW + q)] + [ q( q    q)]
+[ ( q + W + )W] + [  q(W + )] > 0
The term in the rst square parentheses in the rst line is positive if sR = sW ,
but that in the second square parenthesis is negative. Moreover, the term in
the rst square parentheses in the second line is positive if  is high enough
so that  >
 q + W  > 0, but this contradicts the rst condition (31). The
same requirement, i.e., a relatively high  makes the term in the second square
parentheses in the second line positive but this too contradicts (31). In sum,
contradictory assumptions are required to satisfy the three stability conditions.
The system is highly likely to be unstable regardless of whether or not dis-
tributional conict is incorporated.
3.2.2 Scenario B: RER policy targets external account stability
The new system of eqs. (34)-(36) is given by:
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_q = k1(tb  tb)
=  (q;WT ; ; I; tb;);  q < 0,  W ? 0,   < 0 (34)
_WT = k2

  wT
q

= (q;WT ; ; I; tb;); q > 0, W < 0,  = 0 (35)
_ = k3

_KT   I

= (q;WT ; ; I; tb;); q > 0, W < 0,  < 0 (36)
Lets revisit the consequences of an exogenous shock such as a rise in the
investment target. Now that policy makers are manipulating the mix between
consumption spending and investment subsidies, they respond by increasing the
share of the latter. Unlike Scenario A, this has no e¤ect on distribution, and
contrary to Scenario A, the e¤ect of this initial response on the trade balance
is negative. The trade decit means that real depreciation follows over time.
The movement in this second instrument acts to further shrink the initial gap
between actual and target investment, reecting a stable system.
Looking at the stability issue more formally, note rst that, thanks to the
choice of notation, the rst two Routh-Hurwitz stability conditions are the same
as in Scenario A. The rst condition, i.e., (31), is unambiguously satised. Since
qW   Wq = 0 (see Appendix), the second condition reduces to ( qW  
 Wq) < 0. This is unambiguously satised if sR = sW . If sR > sW ,
satisfaction requires that  qW >  Wq, i.e.,
 W
 q
> Wq
. To aid intuition,
normalize the initial value of q to unity, so that W = q. Then, in the case
where sR > sW , stability requires that  W <   q, that is the trade balance be
less sensitive to wages than to the real exchange rate. Why? Recall that the
increase in subsidies subsequent to a rise in the target investment rate leads to
a trade decit and a resulting depreciation. The lagged distributional e¤ect is
to raise the nominal wage over time. But this rise only makes the trade decit
worse in the case where sR > sW . The condition that the trade balance be
relatively insensitive to wage increases helps dampen this feedback loop that
could potentially render the system unstable.
Incorporating qW   Wq = 0 reduces the third condition, i.e., equation
(33), to:
( q+W +)( q  qW  W)  q( q+)+[ Wq( q+W )] > 0
This third condition too is unambiguously satised when sR = sW (i.e.,
 = 0), and only slightly less unambiguously so because the term in the square
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parentheses on the left hand side then has a negative sign when sR > sW .
The su¢ cient, but by no means necessary, condition to unambiguously ensure
stability in the latter case is that the value of  W be relatively low, i.e., the same
condition that ensures satisfaction of condition (32). Even if this condition is
not satised, the satisfaction of (33) is all but ensured.
In sum, while the assignment of instruments matters regardless of the extent
of distributional conict, incorporating distributional considerations and saving
rate di¤erences between functional groups too introduce destabilizing mecha-
nisms. To understand the role of saving di¤erentials in more intuitive terms,
consider rst the case where sR  sW . Rising nominal wages in response to real
depreciation in this case have no impact on consumption but do have a positive
e¤ect on the trade balance (via declining investment), dampening the initial
trade decit. Next, consider the case where sR > sW . Now rising nominal
wages increase consumption and magnify the initial trade decit. The system
is less likely to be stable (although again, only somewhat so).
4 Concluding Remarks
The literature on economic policy, going back to Tinbergen (1952), has recog-
nized that individual economic policy instruments typically impact more than
one objective. In the presence of an omniscient and omnipotent central planner
who can implement policy without lags, this should not necessarily be an issue
as long as the number of instruments matches the number of targets, and the
targets are not mutually inconsistent In a second best world with imperfect in-
formation and lags in policy implementation, however, the issue of appropriate
assignment of instruments to targets gains salience.
The traditional literature on policy assignment has focused on stabilization
and short-run business cycle issues. I have looked here at medium-run capital
accumulation, income distribution, and trade balance issues. In order to do
so, I incorporate saving di¤erentials between functional income groups. Policy
makers target a certain rate of capital accumulation while maintaining the trade
balance in the presence of real wage resistance.
It is well-known that distributional and external account considerations cre-
ate complications in the pursuit of policy. The admittedly stylized analysis
here suggests that scal policy should target investment directly while the real
exchange rate policy should target the trade balance. The opposite policy con-
guration is highly likely to generate dynamic instability. This follows mainly
from the presence of lags in policy execution. In the face of a trade decit,
increased subsidies only increase tradable production over time, and act in fact
to magnify the decit on impact. This creates external balance problems and
instability if scal policy is directed toward maintaining the external balance.
Large saving rate di¤erences between functional income groups may also con-
stitute a source of dynamic instability. Intuitively, any distributional change
that favors spenders over savers has trade balance implications that may frus-
trate achievement of policy targets. When the saving rate di¤erential is suf-
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ciently high, the adjustment mechanisms of the economy may not be strong
enough to eliminate instability even when instruments are appropriately as-
signed to targets. This suggests that the high worker savings often encouraged
by East Asian policy makers may have had greater social utility than is generally
recognized.
Table 1: Denitions of key variables
Variable Denition
Yi Output of sector i (= T;N)
q The relative price of tradables (i.e., the real exchange rate)
Ci Consumption of good i (= T;N)
C Total consumption
I Investment
RN Land rents in the N -sector
wN Real product wage in sector i (= T;N)
Wi Nominal wage in sector i (= T;N)
T Total taxes (t when normalized by the capital stock)
GN Government spending on non-tradables
KT T -sector capital stock
 Share of government expenditures falling on non-tradable consumption
S Total investment subsidies (s when normalized by the capital stock)
, I, tb Target real wage, investment, and (normalized) trade balance, respectively
sR,sW Saving rates out of non-wage and wage income, respectively
5 Appendix
This appendix lists the partial derivatives associated with eqs. (28)-(30) of Sec-
tion 3.2.1 and eqs. (34)-(36) Section 3.2.2 (with k1, k1, and k3 normalized to
unity).
First Scenario A. From eqs. (10), (11), and (28),
@ _q
@q =  f 0wTq2
@ _q
@WT
= f 0 1PNq
@ _q
@ =
T
KT
From equation (29),
@ _WT
@q =
wT
q2
@ _WT
@WT
=   1PNq
@ _WT
@ = 0
From eqs. (17), (19), (21) and (30),
@ _
@q =

q2
n
(+)LN
KT
+ wT   t  f 0wT   (1 )(+)q1 (1 )(+)
o
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@ _
@WT
=
n
f 0  
h
(1 )(+)
1 (1 )(+) + PN
i

o
1
PNq
@ _
@ =
1 (+)
1 (1 )(+) t
Notice that, based on the above expressions,  qW    Wq = @ _q@q @
_WT
@WT
 
@ _q
@WT
@ _WT
@q = 0.
Now consider Scenario B. From eqs. (17), (19), (21), and (34),
@ _q
@q =

q2
n
(+)LN
KT
+ wT   t  f 0wT   (1 )(+)q1 (1 )(+)
o
@ _q
@WT
=  
n
f 0  
h
(1 )(+)
1 (1 )(+) + PN
i

o
1
PNq
@ _q
@ =   1 (+)1 (1 )(+) t
From equation (35),
@ _WT
@q =
wT
q2
@ _WT
@WT
=   1PNq
@ _WT
@ = 0
Based on eqs. (10), (11), and (36):
@ _
@q = f
0wT
q2
@ _
@WT
=  f 0 1PNq
@ _
@ =   TKT
Notice, that, based on the expressions above, qW   Wq = @ _WT@q @ _@q  
@ _WT
@WT
@ _
@q = 0.
References
Allen, R. (2009). Engelspause: Technical change, capital accumulation, and
inequality in the British industrial revolution. Explorations in Economic His-
tory 46 (4), 418435.
Broadberry, S., K. Fukao, and N. Zammit (2015). How did japan catch-up
on the west? a sectoral analysis of anglo-japanese productivity di¤erences,
1885-2000. CEPR Discussion Papers 10570, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
Cooper, R. N. (1971). Currency devaluation in developing countries. In G. Ranis
(Ed.), Government and Economic Development. Massachusetts: The Colonial
Press.
Cravino, J. and A. Levchenko (2015, November). The distributional conse-
quences of large devaluations. Working Paper 648, Research Seminar in In-
ternational Economics, University of Michigan.
Diaz-Alejandro, C. (1963). A note on the impact of devaluation and the redis-
tributive e¤ects. Journal of Political Economy 71, 57780.
16
Dornbusch, R. (1996). The Latin Triangle. Working paper (Massachusetts Insti-
tute of Technology. World Economy Laboratory). World Economy Laboratory
at Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Frieden, J. and L. Broz (2006). The political economy of exchange rates. In
B. Weingast and D. Wittman (Eds.), Oxford Handbook of Political Economy.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Frieden, J., P. Ghezzi, and E. Stein (2001). Politics and Exchange Rates: A
Cross-Country Approach to Latin America. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Uni-
versity Press.
Gala, P. (2008). Real exchange rate levels and economic development: the-
oretical analysis and econometric evidence. Cambridge Journal of Eco-
nomics 32 (2), 273288.
Krugman, P. and L. Taylor (1978, August). Contractionary e¤ects of devalua-
tion. Journal of International Economics 8, 44556.
Levy-Yeyati, E. and F. Sturzenegger (2007, November). Fear of appreciation.
Policy Research Working Paper 4387, The World Bank, Washington, DC.
Libman, E., J. A. Montecino, and A. Razmi (2019, 01). Sustained investment
surges. Oxford Economic Papers.
Lizondo, S. J. and P. J. Montiel (1989, March). Contractionary devaluation in
developing countries: An analytical overview. International Monetary Fund
Sta¤ Papers 36, 182227.
Razmi, A. (2007). The contractionary short-run e¤ects of nominal devaluation
in developing countries: Some neglected nuances. International Review of
Applied Economics 21 (5), 577602.
Razmi, A., M. Rapetti, and P. Skott (2012, March). The real exchange rate and
economic development. Structural Change and Economic Dynamics 23 (1),
15169.
Rodrik, D. (2008). The real exchange rate and economic growth. Brookings
Papers on Economic Activity 2, 365439.
Rodrik, D. (2009). Growth after the crisis. Working Paper 65, Commission on
Growth and Development, Washington, DC.
Stein, E. and J. Streb (2004). Elections and the timing of devaluations. Journal
of International Economics 63 (1), 119145.
Steinberg, D. A. and K. Malhotra (2014). The e¤ect of authoritarian regime
type on exchange rate policy. World Politics 66 (3), 491½U529.
Tinbergen, J. (1952). On the theory of economic policy. Contributions to eco-
nomic analysis. North-Holland.
17
